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THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION 
LISA HEINZERLING* 
On February 27, 2001, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Clean 
Air Act against a constitutional challenge based on the nondelegation doctrine.  
The Court held that the Act provided the requisite “intelligible principle” for 
assignments of authority to the executive, and it also held that the D.C. Circuit 
had erred in allowing an administrative agency to decide the scope of its own 
authority under what that court had held was an impermissibly broad 
assignment of authority.  This article was written before the Supreme Court 
issued its decision. 
The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) form the 
centerpiece of what many consider to be this country’s single most important 
environmental program.  These standards protect public health by governing 
the quality of the outdoor air throughout the nation.  They address the 
pollutants—sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, lead, carbon monoxide, ozone, and 
particulate matter—that are among the best-studied, most pervasive, and most 
diversely harmful of the by-products of industrial society.  A large part of the 
federal regulation that takes place under the Clean Air Act, and most of the 
state regulation, has as its objective the attainment of air quality consistent with 
the NAAQS. 
The Clean Air Act’s NAAQS program is one of the signal success stories 
of American environmental law.  Emissions of most of the pollutants regulated 
by the program have dramatically decreased in the thirty years that the 
program has been in place, despite substantial increases in the size of our 
population and in the amount of economic activity.1  In a recent peer-reviewed, 
retrospective study of the Clean Air Act’s first twenty years, the EPA 
 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Counsel of Record for the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the State of New Jersey, Whitman v. American Trucking 
Ass’ns.   I am grateful to Richard Lazarus and David Vladeck exceedingly helpful comments, and 
to Scott Thomasson and Hannah Stott-Bumsted for superb research assistance on the briefs I filed 
on behalf of Massachusetts and New Jersey in American Trucking.  This article draws heavily on 
those briefs. 
 1. See RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING 
OURSELVES—A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 280 (Yale Univ. 1999) 
(citing U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: 25TH ANNUAL 
REPORT—1994-95, 179, 182 (1997). 
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concluded that the Act had produced almost 22 trillion dollars more in benefits 
than it had imposed in costs, and EPA believed that even this dazzling amount 
probably understated the benefits of the statute.2  A widely cited survey of 
EPA managers conducted in the late 1980’s concluded that the air pollution 
addressed by the NAAQS program should be placed first on a list of 
environmental problems ranked according to the risks they posed to human 
health, welfare, and ecosystems.3 
In the summer of 1997, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
strengthened the air quality standards for two air pollutants, particulate matter 
and ozone, based on mounting scientific evidence of the harmfulness of these 
pollutants at levels allowed by the existing standards.4  With respect to 
particulate matter (PM), the agency found that numerous epidemiological 
studies had established an association between PM levels and premature deaths 
in humans, especially in the elderly population.  Indeed, one study on which 
the EPA relied had found that approximately 60,000 premature deaths in the 
United States alone could be attributed, annually, to particulate matter.5  The 
scientific evidence on PM, however, did not all point in one direction, nor did 
it establish a causal theory as to why PM would cause death.6 
As for ozone, EPA responded to a substantial and growing body of 
scientific evidence linking ozone levels and the initiation and aggravation of 
respiratory problems, including asthma in children.  This evidence, too, posed 
its share of challenges; in particular, the existing evidence seemed to point to 
the possibility that there is no level at which ozone exerts no effect whatsoever 
on the human body.7  That is, it is possible that ozone has some physiological 
effect, albeit perhaps a harmless one, on some person or group of persons at 
every level above zero. 
The standards promulgated based on this body of scientific evidence were 
exceedingly complex.  In setting new air quality standards for PM and ozone, 
EPA established not only an appropriate level for these pollutants in the 
ambient air, but also an averaging time, a statistical “form” (used to measure 
 
 2. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY [hereinafter EPA], OFFICE OF AIR AND 
RADIATION, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970 TO 1990 ES-8 (Oct. 1997).  
This report focused almost exclusively on the consequences of regulating the criteria air 
pollutants.  Id. 
 3. EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PRIORITIES 58 (1987). 
 4. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652 
(1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt 50) [hereinafter Final PM Rule]; National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) 
[hereinafter Final Ozone Rule]. 
 5. For an early press account of this research, see Particles in Air Help Kill 60,000 a Year, 
Study Says, NY TIMES, May 13, 1991, at A13. 
 6. See Final PM Rule, supra note 4. 
 7. See Final Ozone Rule, supra note 4, at 38,863. 
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compliance with the standards), and, for particulate matter, an indicator (based 
on the size of particles to be regulated).  The resulting “suite” of standards for 
PM and ozone, as EPA referred to them, thus consisted of a complex matrix of 
factors relating to air quality. 
A phalanx of industry groups challenged EPA’s new air quality standards.  
Most of the claims raised by industry involved garden-variety administrative 
law issues related to the adequacy of EPA’s explanations for its decisions 
under garden-variety administrative law standards of review.  In a brief 
passage, however, industry parties (and one set of amici) suggested that EPA’s 
implementation of the Clean Air Act involved so much discretion on the part 
of the agency that it violated the constitutional principle of nondelegation. 
Given the summary treatment of this issue by the parties, and more 
fundamentally, given the moribund status of the nondelegation doctrine in 
constitutional law, it came as a surprise when the nondelegation doctrine 
became the primary focus of the D.C. Circuit’s ultimate ruling.  Even more 
surprisingly, the court used the doctrine to hold that the Clean Air Act’s 
provisions relating to national air quality standards, and EPA’s longstanding 
interpretation of those provisions, were unconstitutional.  The court explained 
that “EPA appears to have articulated no ‘intelligible principle’ to channel its 
application of the[] factors [it uses in setting NAAQS]; nor is one apparent 
from the statute.”8 
The D.C. Circuit came to this arresting conclusion based not on a review of 
the Clean Air Act itself, but based instead on a review of EPA’s 1997 
rulemakings on PM and ozone.  The court found the agency’s explanations for 
its rules constitutionally deficient because they did not identify a “stopping 
point” for regulation.  Although the court agreed that the factors EPA considers 
in setting the margin of safety for the NAAQS—such as the nature and severity 
of health effects, the size of the affected population, and the kind of health 
information available and the uncertainties surrounding it—were reasonable, it 
concluded that these factors “do not themselves speak to the issue of degree.”  
Indeed, the court hypothesized, under the agency’s interpretation of the Clean 
Air Act, the agency would be free to set air quality standards at any level 
ranging from zero to the levels experienced during London’s “killer fog”—a 
severe pollution episode in 1952 in which, it is estimated, 4,000 people died 
over a period of one week.9 
The court remanded the case to EPA. The court acknowledged that 
allowing EPA to correct the constitutional defect the court had discerned in the 
statute would not satisfy what the court called a “key function of non-
delegation doctrine,” which is to ensure that Congress, not the agency, 
 
 8. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 9. Id. at 1037. 
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exercises legislative authority.  Indeed, the court conceded that, under its 
approach, “[t]he agency will make the fundamental policy choices.”10 
The court concluded its constitutional analysis by hinting at the kinds of 
standards that might pass constitutional muster.  The court acknowledged that 
what appeared to be its first choice—cost-benefit analysis—was not open to 
EPA given the court’s precedents interpreting the Clean Air Act to forbid EPA 
to consider costs in setting the NAAQS.11  Alternatively, the court proposed 
that EPA develop a “generic unit of harm that takes into account population 
affected, severity and probability.”12  More specifically, the court endorsed 
setting environmental standards according to their effect on “quality-adjusted 
life-years,” although it conceded that the Department of Health and Human 
Services had determined that a similar approach utilized by Oregon in the 
health-care context violated the Americans with Disabilities Act.13 
Each of these features of the court’s opinion—the court’s focus on what 
the agency did rather than what the statute says, its choice of remand rather 
than reversal as a remedy, and its requirement of a quantitative metastandard to 
govern NAAQS rulemakings—was misguided as a matter of both 
constitutional precedent and sound regulatory policy.  Other scholars have ably 
explained why the court’s decision to remand rather than reverse, thus leaving 
the agency itself to impose limits on its own discretion, was an awkward 
outcome to embrace in the name of the nondelegation doctrine.14  In this 
article, I will focus on the problematic nature of the court of appeals’ dismissal 
of the relevant statutory framework and its requirement of a quantitative 
metastandard to govern agency rulemakings.  I begin, however, by suggesting 
a somewhat more mundane reason for disputing the court’s decision: the 
decision rested on a simple factual error, a misunderstanding of the nature of 
nonthreshold pollutants. 
I.  THE “PROBLEM” OF  “NONTHRESHOLD” POLLUTANTS 
In a crucial passage, the D.C. Circuit offered this prelude to its conclusion 
on the constitutionality of the Clean Air Act’s NAAQS program: 
  EPA regards ozone definitely, and PM likely, as nonthreshold pollutants, 
i.e., ones that have some possibility of some adverse health impact (however 
slight) at any exposure level above zero.  See Ozone Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 
at 38,863/3 (“Nor does it seem possible, in the Administrator’s judgment, to 
 
 10. Id. at 1038. 
 11. Id. at 1038; see also Lead Industries Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). 
 12. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1039. 
 13. Id. at 1039 n.5. 
 14. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
303, 350-51 (1999); Robert W. Adler, American Trucking and the Revival (?) of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10233, 10241-44 (2000). 
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identify [an ozone concentration] level at which it can be concluded with 
confidence that no ‘adverse’ effects are likely to occur.”); National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards for Ozone and Particulate Matter, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,637, 
65,651/3 (1996) (proposed rule) (“The single most important factor influencing 
the uncertainty associated with the risk estimates is whether or not a threshold 
concentration exists below which PM-associated health risks are not likely to 
occur.”).  For convenience, we refer to both as non-threshold pollutants; the 
indeterminacy of PM’s status does not affect EPA’s analysis, or ours. 
  Thus the only concentration for ozone and PM that is utterly risk-free, in 
the sense of direct health impacts, is zero.15 
The court went on to assert, in a much-quoted passage, that “EPA’s 
formulation of its policy judgment leaves it free to pick any point between zero 
and a hair below the concentrations yielding London’s Killer Fog.”16 
In their briefs in the Supreme Court, industry groups latched onto the issue 
of health-effects thresholds and made it the centerpiece of their argument 
against EPA’s PM and ozone rules.  Because of the alleged “nonthreshold” 
status of PM and ozone, they asserted, any NAAQS set above zero for these 
pollutants must perforce be arbitrary (unless EPA considered economic costs 
in setting that standard).17 
The arguments of the D.C. Circuit and industry groups based on the 
“nonthreshold” character of PM and ozone betray a deep misunderstanding of 
the concept of a nonthreshold pollutant.  As a consequence, both the court and 
the industry parties before the Supreme Court seriously misrepresented EPA’s 
degree of authority under the Clean Air Act. 
The court and industry parties implicitly embraced a conception of 
nonthreshold pollutants as pollutants that have been shown not to have a 
threshold, that is, pollutants that have been shown to have adverse effects on 
human health or the environment at every nonzero level.  This is not EPA’s 
conception of the scientific evidence regarding PM and ozone. 
When EPA discussed the possibility that particulate matter and ozone are 
nonthreshold pollutants, the agency was referring to the fact that these 
pollutants have not been shown to have a threshold, that is, it has not been 
demonstrated that these pollutants cease to have adverse effects on human 
health or the environment below a certain level.  EPA never claimed to have 
proven that PM and ozone have adverse effects on human health at every 
nonzero level.18  Thus, when EPA discussed the possibility that these are 
 
 15. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034. 
 16. Id. at 1037. 
 17. See, e.g., Brief of Cross-Petitioners Am. Trucking Ass’ns at 25-6, Am. Trucking Ass’ns 
v. Browner, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (No. 99-1426). 
 18. See Final Ozone Rule, supra note 4, at 38,856, 38,863; see also NAAQS Final PM Rule, 
supra note 4, at 38,652, 38,674-75. 
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“nonthreshold” pollutants, it was referring to a lack of evidence that there is a 
threshold. 
This lack of evidence would not be sufficient to support a NAAQS.  The 
Clean Air Act requires the Administrator to present evidence of harm before 
she may set or revise the NAAQS.  She may not set the NAAQS based on the 
lack of evidence of no harm.  Section 108(a)(2) makes this point plain: the 
criteria on which the NAAQS are to be based must describe “all identifiable 
effects on public health or welfare.”19  Indeed, if EPA were allowed to set the 
NAAQS based on the lack of evidence of no harm, there would be no need to 
develop criteria documents at all, because EPA would not be required to show 
health effects before regulating.  In such a regime, it would presumably be up 
to the regulated community to show the harmlessness of air pollution, rather 
than being up to the government to show its harmfulness.  This is not the 
regulatory regime created by the Clean Air Act.20 
As a consequence, the D.C. Circuit’s and industry parties’ suggestion that 
EPA is required or even empowered to set pollutant levels at zero when faced 
with a nonthreshold pollutant is mistaken.  EPA is not required to set the 
NAAQS at zero for such pollutants because nonthreshold pollutants are not 
what the D.C. Circuit and industry groups claimed them to be; they are not 
pollutants that have been shown to be harmful at all nonzero levels, they are 
pollutants that have not been shown to be harmless at all nonzero levels.  
Indeed, if EPA did indeed attempt to set a NAAQS based on the lack of 
evidence of harmlessness rather than based on affirmative evidence of 
harmfulness, I expect that the industry groups that challenged EPA’s PM and 
ozone rules would be first in line to attack the agency’s decision. 
In sum, in the PM and ozone rulemaking proceedings at issue in American 
Trucking, EPA’s observation that particulate matter and ozone may be 
“nonthreshold” pollutants was nothing more than an admission that the agency 
had not proven the existence of a level at which these pollutants had no effects 
on human health.  It was not a claim that the agency had shown that these 
pollutants do have effects on human health at every concentration level above 
zero.  It was also not a claim that the agency would regard all such effects on 
health, if detected, to be sufficiently “adverse” to warrant a regulatory 
response.21  Nor was it a claim that the agency would regard all such effects to 
be effects on public health within the meaning of the Clean Air Act.22  Thus, 
 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 20. In contrast, in Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) 
[herinafter Benzene] the Court addressed the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s 
“cancer policy,” which presumed that no safe level of carcinogenic substances existed and 
required workplace standards to be set based on this presumption.  Id. at 624.  EPA has never 
adopted this kind of presumption in setting the NAAQS. 
 21. See S. REP. NO. 91-1196 at 10 (2nd Sess. 1970). 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000). 
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even where a safe level (a “threshold”) for a pollutant has not been proven, 
EPA still may, nonarbitrarily, set the NAAQS for that pollutant based on the 
agency’s judgment with respect to such factors as uncertainties surrounding the 
evidence of health effects, the adverse nature of the detectable effects, and the 
size of the population affected.  And indeed that is exactly the process EPA has 
followed in thirty years of regulation under the NAAQS program. 
II.  THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court has long instructed that nondelegation claims are to be 
evaluated by consulting the language, purpose, and history of the statutory 
provision under consideration.23  The D.C. Circuit skipped over this crucial 
step.  As explained below, had the court not done so, it would have found that 
the Act fits comfortably within the range of statutes long upheld by the Court 
against nondelegation attacks.  Moreover, if one considers the history of the 
development of the NAAQS program in Congress, one sees that the Clean Air 
Act embodies the kind of dialogue and collaboration between Congress and the 
executive that celebrates rather than denigrates the principles animating the 
nondelegation doctrine. 
A. Standard Nondelegation Analysis 
The Clean Air Act is plainly constitutional under the Supreme Court’s 
existing precedents.  The Act places numerous significant constraints on EPA’s 
discretion in setting the NAAQS: it prescribes the factors EPA may and may 
not consider; requires a margin of safety as an antidote to scientific 
uncertainty; limits the range of pollutants regulated by the NAAQS program; 
limits the life span of each NAAQS; and imposes large procedural constraints 
on EPA’s decisionmaking, including an intensive process of scientific review.  
Congress has thus made the most basic and important decisions that arise in 
setting air quality standards; at every important decision-point in the process of 
setting air quality standards, EPA’s discretion is constrained by a choice 
Congress has made.  With its multiple substantive constraints on the actions of 
a federal agency, its limited jurisdictional reach, and its abundant procedural 
protections, the Clean Air Act is clearly constitutional. 
Substantive constraints.  The Clean Air Act places numerous substantive 
constraints on EPA’s decisions setting the NAAQS.  First of all, the Act 
constrains EPA’s discretion by excluding some factors from EPA’s 
consideration.  In setting the NAAQS, EPA may consider only the effects of 
the relevant air pollutant on human health and welfare.24  As EPA has 
recognized since it issued the very first NAAQS thirty years ago, it may not 
 
 23. See, e.g., Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946). 
 24. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (NAAQS to be “based on” air quality criteria); 42 U.S.C. § 
7408(a)(2) (criteria to describe scientific information on health and welfare effects of pollutants). 
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consider economic and technological feasibility in setting the NAAQS.25  In 
excluding the consideration of costs and technology and focusing only on 
human health and welfare, Congress squarely confronted the most difficult and 
most basic choice a decisionmaker faces when devising environmental 
standards—whether the government should trade off human lives and health 
for dollars—and firmly answered “no.”26 
Second, the Act also sets forth the factors EPA must consider in 
establishing the NAAQS.  NAAQS must be “based on” the air quality 
criteria,27 which, in turn, must be based on “the latest scientific knowledge 
useful in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public 
health or welfare which may be expected from the presence of such pollutant 
in the ambient air . . . .”28  Virtually every one of the words in the quoted 
passage significantly constrains EPA’s discretion. 
EPA must base the NAAQS on the latest scientific knowledge—not on 
outdated information, not on nonscientific data.  EPA must be cognizant of all 
identifiable effects on public health and welfare.  Yet the agency must also bear 
in mind the kind and extent of these effects—which is another way of saying 
that EPA should distinguish among effects based on their severity and 
magnitude. 
In addition, the statute’s emphasis on public health directs EPA’s attention 
to populations rather than individuals, thus precluding EPA from setting a 
NAAQS in order to protect a single individual from harm.  In this way, the 
Clean Air Act is very different from the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 
at issue in Benzene.  That statute aspires to achieve workplaces in which “no 
employee” suffers a “material impairment of health or functional capacity” 
from toxic materials or harmful physical agents.29  In Benzene, a plurality of 
Justices thus worried that the statute might allow the government to require 
large expenditures based on “the mere possibility that some employee 
somewhere in the country may confront some risk of cancer.”30  Such a 
“possibility” is simply not the basis for regulation under the Clean Air Act. 
In so prescribing the range of findings EPA must make and the range of 
factors it must consider, the Clean Air Act is a close cousin to the statutes the 
Supreme Court has recently upheld against nondelegation challenges.31 
 
 25. See 36 Fed. Reg. 8186 (1971) (explaining that EPA did not consider comments 
concerning feasibility because “the Clean Air Act, as amended, does not permit any factors other 
than health to be taken into account in setting the primary standards”). 
 26. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 672 U.S. at 672 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2). 
 29. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 612 (emphasis added). 
 30. Id. at 652. 
 31. See Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1991); Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline 
Co., 490 U.S. 212, 219-20 (1989); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 375-77 (1989).  
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The Clean Air Act not only tells EPA what to consider in setting the 
NAAQs, it also gives the agency a great deal of guidance as to the ultimate 
content of the standards.  First, EPA must set the primary NAAQS at a level 
which is “requisite to protect the public health.”32  The use of the term 
“requisite” limits EPA’s standard-setting discretion on both the low and high 
ends; it implies a degree of necessity for the standards and yet also forbids the 
Administrator to set standards inadequate to protect the public health. 
In addition, EPA must allow “an adequate margin of safety” in setting the 
primary NAAQS.33  The requirement of a margin of safety prescribes a 
particular approach toward scientific uncertainty for EPA; where the science is 
uncertain, it tells EPA to lean toward the more stringent end of the range of 
alternative standards rather than toward the less stringent end. 
Finally, the NAAQS for any given pollutant must be uniform throughout 
the country.34  The question whether to permit variations in the national air 
quality standards35—to account for differing regional or local conditions in 
weather, population densities, and so forth—is a public policy issue of the 
highest order.  Congress squarely addressed that issue and decided against 
nonuniform standards.  In this way as well, the Clean Air Act resembles the 
statute upheld against a nondelegation challenge in Skinner v. Mid-America 
Pipeline Co., which precluded a case-by-case determination of the governing 
rules and opted instead for a uniform rule.36 
Jurisdictional limits.  The NAAQS apply to only a limited subset of air 
pollutants—widespread pollutants (i.e., those from “numerous and diverse 
sources”) that endanger public health or welfare.37  Indeed, since 1978, as 
noted above, the NAAQS program has been limited to only six air pollutants, 
out of the many hundreds of such pollutants that exist today.38  Thus, as in 
United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, Inc.,39 for example, the territory over 
which the executive’s discretion may range is extremely limited.40 
 
Indeed, in Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996), the Court concluded that the federal 
statute giving the President authority to define the aggravating factors that permit a court-martial 
to impose the death penalty need not give any guidance to the executive in order to survive a 
nondelegation challenge.  See id. at 772-73. 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1). 
 35. States are free, of course, to set stricter standards, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2000), but the 
national standards must be uniform. 
 36. See Skinner, 490 U.S. at 219. 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1). 
 38. The Clean Air Act’s program addressing toxic air pollutants, for example, covers 
approximately 180 different pollutants.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1). 
 39. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939). 
 40. See id. at 576 (authorizing Secretary of Agriculture to issue orders with respect to only 
certain kinds of agricultural commodities). 
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The reach of any given NAAQS is limited as well.  EPA must review 
every NAAQS, and the criteria on which the NAAQS are based, every five 
years.41  This requirement has caused EPA to undertake numerous reviews and 
revisions of the criteria and NAAQS.42  Indeed, the NAAQS at issue here grew 
out of EPA’s obligatory review of the criteria documents for PM and ozone.  
EPA’s continuing obligation to revisit the criteria and NAAQS means that the 
life span of any given NAAQS is limited to the period in which the scientific 
data on which it is based remains reliable. 
In the latter respect, the Clean Air Act is more restrictive than some 
congressional assignments of authority the Court has upheld.  In Field v. 
Clark,43 the Court affirmed Congress’s authority to assign to the President the 
task of suspending free trade in certain commodities, under certain conditions, 
“for such time as he shall deem just.”44  The Court concluded that the President 
“had no discretion in the premises except in respect to the duration of the 
suspension so ordered,” and that this discretion “related only to the 
enforcement of the policy established by Congress.”45  In limiting the duration 
of any one decision on the NAAQS, therefore, the Clean Air Act is more 
restrictive than the statute upheld in Field. 
Procedural requirements.  The Clean Air Act also contains numerous 
procedural requirements that further limit the Administrator’s actions.  First of 
all, the Act requires EPA to develop and rely on the criteria document.  In 
providing that the original NAAQS were to be based on the criteria documents 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) had compiled as of 
1970,46 the Act guides EPA’s development of the criteria on which the 
NAAQS depend.  As discussed in the next section, HEW’s criteria considered 
only scientific information on pollutants’ effects on health and welfare; looked 
carefully at effects on especially vulnerable subpopulations; and candidly 
acknowledged the uncertainties attendant upon predicting the adverse effects 
of air pollution.  Congress’s endorsement of HEW’s criteria documents thus 
provides substantial guidance to EPA in its development of such documents. 
Second, the Act also requires EPA to consult with the Clean Air Scientific 
Advisory Committee (CASAC) in formulating the criteria and in shaping 
NAAQS in light of the criteria.  The Administrator may significantly depart 
from CASAC’s recommendations only if she explains why she has done so.47  
In this case, when CASAC was able to achieve a scientific consensus, the 
Administrator’s actions hewed closely to it.  In setting the ozone standard, for 
 
 41. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1). 
 42. See EPA, supra note 3. 
 43. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
 44. Id. at 680 (emphasis added). 
 45. Id. at 693. 
 46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(a), (b). 
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3). 
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example, the Administrator considered ozone levels only within a range 
approved by CASAC and declined to set the standard at the lowest end of that 
range in part because no member of CASAC had endorsed such a low 
standard.48 
Third, the Administrator’s actions are subject to the exacting requirements 
of the Administrative Procedure Act and judicial review for arbitrariness.  The 
Court has suggested that procedural requirements and the availability of 
judicial review are important factors in evaluating the propriety of Congress’s 
assignments of authority to the executive branch.49 
Containing as it does these manifold constraints on the substance, scope, 
and process of the NAAQS program, the Clean Air Act compares extremely 
favorably to the assignments of authority from Congress to the executive that 
the Court has upheld, many of which have left large and basic questions for the 
agency to address.50 
Furthermore, the Clean Air Act is a world away from the only statute the 
Court has ever invalidated under the delegation doctrine.  In two cases decided 
in 1935, the Court invalidated two separate provisions of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933.  In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States,51 the Court zeroed in on the delegation of lawmaking authority to 
 
 48. Final Ozone Rule, supra note 4, at 38,861, 38,868. 
 49. See Am. Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 105; Touby, 500 U.S. at 168-69.  In addition, 
the administrative official—the Administrator of the EPA—to whom authority is granted is 
“clearly specified,” and is a politically accountable official of “high governmental authority.”  
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 787 (1948).  Furthermore, because the Administrator is 
charged not only with setting the NAAQS but also with ensuring their implementation by the 
states, CAA §§ 110, 179, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7509 (2000), and because the NAAQS themselves 
contain elements—such as their “form”—that partake of both lawmaking and executive 
functions, this case does not present a situation in which the entity to whom authority has been 
assigned exercises nothing but the lawmaking function.  Cf. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 50. In addition to the cases already mentioned, see, for example, Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 
U.S. 470 (1904); OPP Cotton Mills v. Administrator Wage & Hour Div., Dept. of Labor, 312 
U.S. 126 (1941); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).  As Justice Scalia has aptly 
observed: 
By no means can the environmental laws be considered among those conferring the 
greatest amount of discretion upon the agencies.  In fact, they are probably among those 
conferring the least.  Not only is general policy not left to be disposed of by the agencies 
under the general standards of “public interest, convenience and necessity,” but in some 
areas even cost-benefit analysis is excluded.  For example, national primary ambient air 
quality standards are to be established not in light of what is “feasible” or “reasonable” (a 
formulation that would enable counterbalancing costs to be offset against the benefit of 
clean air) but rather on the sole basis of what is “requisite to protect the public health.” 
Antonin Scalia, Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies Under Environmental Laws, 24 HOUS. L. 
REV. 97, 102 (1987) (citing CAA § 109(b), 42 U.S.C. §7409(b)). 
 51. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
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private groups in invalidating section 3 of the statute,52 and in Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan,53 the Court fixed on the lack of any operative rule in 
invalidating a criminal conviction under section 9 of the statute.54  Neither of 
these extreme circumstances is presented by the Clean Air Act. 
The Clean Air Act clearly lays down the “intelligible principle” that the 
Court has required of assignments of authority from Congress to the executive.  
Moreover, given that EPA has always interpreted the Act in a way that heeds 
all of these constraints on its own discretion, the EPA’s interpretation of the 
Act is likewise clearly constitutional. 
B. Nonstandard Nondelegation Analysis: The Relevance of Dialogue and 
Collaboration 
According to the Court, the delegation doctrine “has developed to prevent 
Congress from forsaking its duties.”55  It is thus highly relevant that Congress 
has, from the beginning, kept an exceedingly close eye on the development of 
air quality criteria and standards and has frequently altered statutory 
requirements in response to agency decisions and experience.  Far from 
abdicating its legislative role, Congress has actively shaped the contours of the 
federal program protecting air quality.  Indeed, as I explain below, all of the 
constraints discussed in the preceding section were forged in Congress based 
on an ongoing dialogue with the executive agency charged with implementing 
the Clean Air Act. 
The Clean Air Act today embodies no fewer than eleven separate Acts of 
Congress, stretching back almost 50 years.56  These five decades of federal air 
pollution law have witnessed an extraordinary collaboration between Congress 
and the agencies that have been charged with implementing Congress’s 
commands.  In the historical development of the Clean Air Act, one can 
observe a decades-long dialogue between Congress and the executive about the 
scope and content of federal air pollution policy.  This collaboration and 
dialogue has led to numerous extremely precise and significant refinements in 
the statutory language relating to air quality criteria and standards, refinements 
that reflect the congressional response to the executive’s experiences in 
grappling with the problem of air pollution. 
Congress’s effort to address the problem of air pollution began in 1955.  
The first federal law on air pollution authorized the Surgeon General to 
conduct studies on the consequences and prevention of air pollution and 
 
 52. Id. at 521-25. 
 53. 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 54. Id. at 412-13.  See also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 486 (1998) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (noting distinctive facts of both cases). 
 55. Loving, 517 U.S. at 758. 
 56. See 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 124 (2d ed. 1994). 
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provided funding for this research.57  Reflecting Congress’s conviction at the 
time that air pollution was a matter for states and local governments to address, 
a primary purpose of the research was to help these entities attack air pollution 
problems on their own.58  To this day, a primary aim of the Clean Air Act is to 
promote research into the causes and consequences of air pollution; indeed, 
vestiges of the 1955 statute can be found in today’s Clean Air Act.59 
The early federal legislation reflected the growing awareness that air 
pollution posed a serious threat to the population’s health and welfare.  Severe 
air pollution episodes in Donora, Pennsylvania, in 1948, in London in 1952, 
and in New York City in 1953 had together caused the deaths of thousands of 
people.60  A study of the Donora episode performed by the United States 
Public Health Service provided the first definitive evidence of the acute health 
effects of air pollution.61  Studies performed in the 1950s also began to 
establish a causal link between automotive exhausts and smog.62  In 1960, 
Congress responded to these early findings by passing the Schenck Act, calling 
for further research into the consequences for health and welfare of motor 
vehicle exhaust.63  Thus the early years of federal air pollution legislation 
witnessed a consistent pattern: preliminary research showed a threat from air 
pollution; this research was followed by critiques and counter-research; and the 
eventual result was typically research confirming the existence of a threat.  
This pattern – the pattern, in fact, of scientific inquiry—is a recurring, indeed 
defining, feature of air pollution control. 
The 1960s witnessed the federal government’s steadily increasing 
involvement in addressing air pollution.  In 1963, Congress enacted the 
original Clean Air Act.64  This statute for the first time authorized the federal 
government—acting through the Secretary of the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW)—to establish “criteria” for air quality.65  The 
language describing the scope and content of the original air quality criteria 
 
 57. See Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7409). 
 58. See id. 
 59. Compare 69 Stat. 322(3), with 42 U.S.C. § 7403(a)(3) (authorizing Surgeon General and 
EPA, respectively, to conduct research and make recommendations at the request of state and 
local agencies). 
 60. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., A STUDY OF 
POLLUTION –AIR 13 (Comm. Print 1963). 
 61. See H.H. SCHRENK, U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, AIR POLLUTION IN DONORA, PA. 1 
(1949). 
 62. Air Pollution Problems: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Small Business, 
84th Cong., 42 (1956) (statement of Arie J. Haagen-Smit, Cal. Inst. of Tech.). 
 63. See Act of June 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-493, 74 Stat. 162 (1960). 
 64. See Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392. 
 65. Id. 
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was strikingly similar to the corresponding language of the Clean Air Act 
today.66 
The Clean Air Act of 1963 also directed the Secretary to gather and 
publish information on air pollution control techniques.67  The criteria and the 
information on control techniques were to be made available to state, local, and 
interstate air pollution control agencies,68 and the Secretary was directed to 
help these agencies develop their own standards to control air pollution.69  
Somewhat confusingly, Congress used the same term, “criteria,” for both the 
scientific information on the consequences of air pollution and standards for 
air quality.70  But the basic goal of the standards was clear enough and has 
persisted to this day: the Secretary was to recommend to local, state, or 
interstate air pollution control agencies those standards which “in [the 
Secretary’s] judgment may be necessary to protect the public health and 
welfare.”71 
The Clean Air Act of 1963 thus introduced some of the broad outlines of 
federal air pollution policy as it exists today.  However, the statute did not set 
deadlines for HEW’s establishment of air quality criteria; it encouraged but did 
not require the establishment of air quality standards by states and local 
governments; and it provided new but cumbersome and limited mechanisms 
for the control of interstate air pollution.72  Thus, it is not surprising that little 
happened under the Clean Air Act of 1963: HEW published air quality criteria 
for only one set of air pollutants, sulfur oxides,73 and the enforcement 
mechanisms created by the Act proved inadequate.74 
In 1967, Congress acted again.75  In the Air Quality Act of 1967, Congress 
directed the Secretary of HEW to establish air quality criteria that were to 
 
 66. The statute provided: 
Whenever [the Secretary] determines that there is a particular air pollution agent (or 
combination of agents), present in the air in certain quantities, producing effects harmful 
to the health or welfare of persons, the Secretary shall compile and publish criteria 
reflecting accurately the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and 
extent of such effects which may be expected from the presence of such air pollutant 
agent (or combination of agents) in the air in varying quantities.  42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2). 
 67. See §§ 3(a)(1), 3(b)(8), 77 Stat. at 394-95. 
 68. See § 3(c)(2), 77 Stat. at 395. 
 69. See §§ 2(a), 3(a)(2), 3(b), 77 Stat. at 393-95. 
 70. See § 3(c)(3), 77 Stat. at 395. 
 71. See § 3(c)(3), 77 Stat. at 395. 
 72. See § 3(c)(2)-(3), 5, 77 Stat. at 395-99. 
 73. See PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, HEW, PUB. NO. 1619, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR 
SULFUR OXIDES xxix (1967)  [hereinafter 1967 SOx Criteria Doc.]. 
 74. See Rodgers, supra note 56, at 130. 
 75. Congress also had, two years before, passed amendments to the Clean Air Act which, for 
the first time, directed the Secretary to set emissions standards for motor vehicles.  See Motor 
Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, § 202, 79 Stat. 992 (1965). 
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reflect “the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent 
of all identifiable effects on health and welfare which may be expected from 
the presence of an air pollution agent, or combination of agents in the ambient 
air, in varying quantities.”76  In developing the criteria, the Secretary was 
directed to consult with “appropriate advisory committees and Federal 
departments and agencies.”77  In light of this new requirement, the Secretary 
was told to reevaluate the only criteria document he had issued so far (on 
sulfur oxides).78  The 1967 Act also introduced part of the language that now 
governs the NAAQS themselves: the Act directed the Secretary to issue “such 
criteria of air quality as in his judgment may be requisite for the protection of 
the public health and welfare.”79 
Congress continued to rely largely on the states for the development of air 
quality standards (rules governing air quality) as opposed to criteria (the 
scientific documents on which the standards were to depend).  But in the 1967 
Act, Congress created an important exception to this rule: if a state did not 
establish air quality standards for air pollutants for which the Secretary had 
issued criteria or if a state established standards which were not “consistent 
with” the Secretary’s criteria, the Secretary himself was required to promulgate 
air quality standards for that state.80 
Once again, however, the statute did not obligate HEW to act by a certain 
date, nor did it obligate the states to act at all.  And, once again, progress under 
the statute was disappointing.  By late 1969, HEW had issued criteria for only 
two pollutants;81 fewer than half of the states had set air quality standards for 
sulfur oxides;82 and no state air quality standard had been approved by HEW.83  
In addition, the enforcement mechanisms of the 1967 Act, aimed at interstate 
 
 76. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 107(b)(2), 81 Stat. 491 (1967).  The 1967 
Act also continued to require the Secretary to develop and disseminate information on control 
techniques.  For the first time, Congress required that this information include information on 
technological and economic feasibility.  See § 107(c), 81 Stat. at 491. 
 77. § 107(b)(1), 81 Stat. at 491. 
 78. See id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. § 107(c)(2). 
 81. See 1967 SOx Criteria Doc., supra note 73; see also NATIONAL AIR POLLUTION 
CONTROL ADMINISTRATION (NAPCA), HEW, PUB. NO. AP-49, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR 
PARTICULATE MATTER iv (1969) [hereinafter 1969 PM Criteria Doc.]. 
 82. See SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PROGRESS IN THE 
PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION, S. DOC. No. 91-64, at 16-18; see also Air 
Pollution – 1970: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate 
Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong. (March 17, 1970) (app. – pt. 1) [hereinafter March 17 
Hearing]. 
 83. See March 17 Hearing, supra note 82, at app. – pt. 1. 
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air pollution, lay almost entirely dormant.84  By the time HEW issued criteria 
for three more air pollutants in early 1970,85 Congress was already at work on 
new legislation. 
The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 reflected a fundamental break with 
the past in several respects.  The most obvious change was institutional: for the 
first time, Congress required the federal government to set standards for air 
quality even in the absence of a finding of inadequacy with respect to any state 
standards.  The states retained the task of implementing the air quality 
standards, but EPA—created during Congress’s deliberations on the 1970 
Amendments86—was directed to set the standards.87 
Also for the first time, Congress limited the category of air pollutants to 
which the air quality standards would apply.  The 1970 Amendments provided 
that the standards would be set only for pollutants listed by EPA, and that EPA 
would list a pollutant only if it “has an adverse effect on public health or 
welfare” and comes from “numerous or diverse” sources.88 
With respect to the air quality criteria, Congress required for the first time 
that the criteria describe effects on “public health and welfare.”  Previously, it 
had required that criteria describe effects on the health and welfare “of 
persons”89 or simply on “health and welfare.”90  Indeed, the original Senate 
version of the 1970 amendments referred to the “health of persons,” but the 
House version—referring to “public health or welfare”—prevailed.91  
Tellingly, at the same time, Congress endorsed the same shift in emphasis with 
respect to mobile source emission standards: whereas, in 1965, Congress had 
called for mobile source emissions standards whenever air pollutants 
endangered the “health or welfare of any persons,” in 1970, Congress required 
 
 84. See S. DOC. NO. 91-64, supra note 82, at 24-25; see also March 17 Hearing, supra note 
82, at app. – pt. 1. 
 85. See NAPCA, HEW, PUB. NO. AP-62, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR CARBON MONOXIDE 
10-7 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 CO Criteria Doc.]; NAPCA, HEW, PUB. NO. AP-64, AIR QUALITY 
CRITERIA FOR PHOTOCHEMICAL OXIDANTS 1-1 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Ozone Criteria Doc.]; 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR HYDROCARBONS 
1-1 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 HC Criteria Doc.]. 
 86. See Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 5 U.S.C.A. App. (Supp. 1996). 
 87. See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 109, § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1679.  
States are free, however, to set air quality standards that are stricter than the federal standards. 42 
U.S.C. § 7416. 
 88. § 108, § 4(a), 84 Stat. at 1678. 
 89. Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 3(c)(2), 77 Stat. 392, 395. 
 90. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 107(b)(1), §2, 81 Stat. 491. 
 91. Compare H.R. 17255, 91st Cong. § 2(a) (1970) (requiring air quality standards to be set 
for pollutants that “endanger or may endanger the public health or welfare”) with H.R. 17255, 
91st Cong. § 10(a)(3) (1970) (providing that air quality standards are those the attainment and 
maintenance of which are “necessary to protect the health of persons”). 
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such standards only when the “public health or welfare” was at risk.92  By 
targeting public health, Congress instructed EPA to target health effects in 
populations rather than in single individuals.93 
Congress also made two significant adjustments to the substance of the air 
quality standards.  Although Congress had previously directed HEW to 
encourage states and local governments to set uniform standards,94 it had never 
required uniformity.  This changed in 1970: Congress required EPA’s new air 
quality standards to be nationally uniform.95 
The 1970 Amendments also stated for the first time that the air quality 
standards protecting human health—the primary standards96—must embody 
“an adequate margin of safety.”97  The requirement of a margin of safety 
followed directly from HEW’s experience in developing its first criteria 
documents. 
HEW’s research regarding the first criteria pollutants had revealed several 
important features (and limits) of scientific inquiry into the effects of air 
pollution on human health and welfare.  First of all, HEW’s review of the 
scientific literature on the criteria pollutants had revealed a diverse array of 
harms which occurred at a diverse array of pollution levels.98  The effects on 
human health alone, HEW had discovered, varied widely, including such 
disparate effects as the initiation and/or aggravation of respiratory diseases 
 
 92. Compare Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, § 
202(a), §6, 79 Stat. 992, with Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 202 
(a)(1), §6, 84 Stat. 1690. 
 93. The Senate Report stated that NAAQS must “protect the health of any group of the 
population,” including sensitive groups for which “reference should be made to a representative 
sample of persons comprising the sensitive group rather than to a single person in the group.”  S. 
REP. No. 91-1196, at 10 (2d Sess. 1970). 
 94. See Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 2(a), 77 Stat. 393. 
 95. See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, §109(a)(1), § 4(a), 84 Stat. 
1679 (directing Administrator to publish “a” primary NAAQS and “a” secondary NAAQS for 
each criteria pollutant). 
 96. The creation of two categories of standards – primary and secondary – was another 
innovation of the 1970 Amendments.  Id. §109, § 4(a), 84 Stat. at 1679-80. 
 97. Id. § 109(b)(1), § 4(a), 84 Stat. at 1679. 
 98. See 1967 SOx Criteria Doc., supra note 73, at 1iii (graphic depiction of results of studies 
concerning health and welfare effects of sulfur oxides); see 1969 PM Criteria Document, supra 
note 81, at 188-89 (summary of health effects at various exposure levels); see 1970 CO Criteria 
Doc., supra note 85, at 10-7 (table reflecting health effects at various exposure levels); 1970 
Ozone Criteria Doc., supra note 85, at 10-9 to 10-13 (text and table detailing health and welfare 
effects associated with different levels of exposure). 
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including bronchitis99 and asthma,100 impairment of the oxygen-carrying 
capacity of the blood,101 and premature death.102 
Second, HEW’s research had revealed no bright-line pollutant level above 
which adverse effects on human health and welfare were certain to occur and 
below which such effects did not occur.  Identifying a bright line above which 
adverse effects would certainly occur proved difficult because much of the 
research on air pollution studied the effects of pollutants in combination rather 
than in isolation; thus, in developing the criteria for sulfur oxides, for example, 
HEW acknowledged the possibility that the health effects it found were due to 
the combination of sulfur oxides and other pollutants rather than to sulfur 
oxides alone.103  Inconsistencies among scientific studies,104 and shortcomings 
in the studies’ methodologies,105 created further difficulties.106 
At the same time, HEW had little confidence that the lowest levels at 
which adverse effects had been detected in the scientific literature were in fact 
the lowest levels at which such effects occurred.107  Equally important, HEW 
had discovered that part of the reason why it was difficult or impossible to 
identify a single “safe” level of pollution was that different people responded 
differently to air pollution.  HEW’s research had revealed that certain 
subpopulations—including the elderly108 and people with preexisting 
 
 99. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL OFFICE, EPA, PUB. NO. AP-84, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR 
NITROGEN OXIDES 11-8  (1971) [hereinafter 1971 NOx Criteria Doc.]. 
 100. See 1970 Ozone Criteria Doc., supra note 85, at 10-7. 
 101. Id. at 10-3. 
 102. See 1967 SOx Criteria Doc., supra note 73, at xxix. 
 103. Id. at v-vi. 
 104. See 1970 Ozone Criteria Doc., supra note 85, at 10-7, 10-8. 
 105. 1969 PM Criteria Doc., supra note 81, at 183 (failure to control for smoking habits). 
 106. HEW also encountered challenges simply in measuring exposure levels.  See, e.g., 1970 
Ozone Criteria Doc., supra note 85, at 10-1, 10-2. 
 107. In its 1969 guidelines on developing air quality criteria, HEW explained: 
The exposure levels which have thus far been associated with identifiable effects . . . are 
not necessarily the lowest levels of exposure that will produce such effects.  Nor are those 
effects necessarily the only ones produced by such exposures.  Knowledge of the 
synergistic effects of air pollutants is limited.  So is knowledge of possible long-term 
genetic effects. . . . In short, air quality criteria cannot be interpreted as threshold values; 
indeed, for many types of air pollutants, there may not be a threshold of risk to health and 
the environment.  In the evaluation of biological effects of environmental contaminants, 
whether in the community or occupational environment, accumulating evidence has 
almost invariably shown that adverse effects can and do occur at exposure levels that at 
one time were considered “safe.” 
NAPCA, HEW, GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR QUALITY STANDARDS AND 
IMPLEMENTATION PLANS 16 (1969). 
 108. See 1970 Ozone Criteria Doc., supra note 85, at 10-7. 
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cardiovascular or respiratory disease109—were most susceptible to the adverse 
effects of air pollution.110  In the first criteria document on particulate matter, 
HEW observed that many effects on sensitive subpopulations would not be 
picked up by epidemiological research because the sample sizes were often too 
small.111 
HEW responded to these challenges by endorsing an approach to standard-
setting that leaned in favor of more rather than less stringent standards.  In 
every criteria document published after 1967,112 HEW closed with a 
recommendation to the following effect: 
It is reasonable and prudent to conclude that, when promulgating ambient air 
quality standards, consideration should be given to requirements for margins of 
safety which take into account long-term effects on health and materials 
occurring below the above levels.113 
This recommendation was directed at the local, state, and interstate agencies 
which were, at that time, responsible for setting air quality standards.114 
The 1970 Amendments dealt with the challenges HEW had encountered in 
two ways.  First, as noted, the Amendments required for the first time a 
 
 109. See 1967 SOx Criteria Doc., supra note 73, at xxviii; 1969 PM Criteria Doc., supra note 
81, at 188 (aggravation of bronchitis); 1970 Ozone Criteria Doc., supra note 85, at 10-7 
(aggravation of asthma); 1970 CO Criteria Doc., supra note 85, at 10-4. 
 110. Congress also had reason to believe that children comprised a subpopulation that might 
be especially sensitive to air pollution.  In his floor statement introducing the 1970 Amendments, 
Senator Muskie referred to a study concerning the health effects of nitrogen dioxide on children. 
116 CONG. REC. 32,913 (1970). 
 111. See 1969 PM Criteria Doc., supra note 81, at 188. 
 112. The hydrocarbons criteria document did not offer this recommendation because HEW 
found that hydrocarbons cause no direct health effects by themselves; they cause adverse effects 
only by interacting with other pollutants to form ozone.  1970 HC Criteria Doc., supra note 85, at 
8-5. 
 113. 1969 PM Criteria Doc., supra note 81, at 189; see also 1970 Ozone Criteria Doc., supra 
note 85, at 10-13; 1970 CO Criteria Doc., supra note 85, at 10-6; 1971 NOx Criteria Doc., supra 
note 99, at 11-12. 
 114. Congress was well aware of HEW’s practice of recommending margins of safety for air 
quality standards.  In a Senate hearing during the crafting of the 1970 amendments, the head of 
the HEW unit responsible for developing air quality criteria and standards noted HEW’s practice 
of including a margin of safety in its recommendations, claiming that the margin of safety 
corrected for the fact that “the no-effect level always corresponds . . . to the limitations of 
scientific knowledge in this area.”  Air Pollution—1970: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air 
and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (May 27, 1970) 
(statement of Dr. John T. Middleton, Commissioner, National Air Pollution Control 
Administration, HEW). 
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“margin of safety” in air quality standards, thus accepting the recommendation 
HEW had made in its criteria documents.115 
Second, Congress endorsed the criteria documents HEW had so far 
compiled.  Congress did not require HEW to reevaluate any existing criteria, as 
it had done in 1967 with respect to the sulfur oxides criteria.  Moreover, not 
only did Congress require air quality standards to be “based on” the criteria 
rather than merely “consistent with” them,116 it also required EPA to base the 
very first NAAQS on HEW’s existing criteria.117  These facts signal a 
congressional endorsement of HEW’s basic approach in the criteria documents 
compiled as of 1970—an approach which featured inquiry only into the 
consequences for health and welfare of pollutants in the ambient air; close 
attention to the effects of air pollution on sensitive segments of the 
population;118 and knowing recognition of the difficulties of drawing a bright 
line between pollution that is harmful and pollution that is not. 
Congress substantially revised the Clean Air Act again in 1977, making 
three important adjustments to the NAAQS-setting process.  First, Congress 
added the requirement that the criteria and the NAAQS be reviewed and, if 
appropriate, revised every five years.119  Second, Congress required EPA to 
create and to consult with CASAC.120  Finally, Congress altered the 
requirements for determining which pollutants were subject to the NAAQS 
program: whereas in 1970 Congress had specified that the program applied to a 
pollutant if it “has an adverse effect on public health or welfare,”121 in 1977 it 
provided that the program applied to a pollutant if it “may reasonably be 
 
 115. The Senate report on the legislation explained that “margins of safety are essential to any 
health-related environmental standards if a reasonable degree of protection is to be provided 
against hazards which research has not yet identified.”  S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 10. 
 116. Compare Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 108(c)(1), § 2, 81 Stat. 491, 
with Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 109(b)(1), § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1680. 
 117. See 42 U.S.C. §7409(a)(1)(A) (requiring EPA Administrator to issue, within 30 days 
from the enactment of the 1970 amendments, primary and secondary NAAQS “for each air 
pollutant for which air quality criteria have been issued prior to such date”). 
 118. The 1970 Senate Report emphasized that “[c]oncern for health effects must extend 
beyond “normal” segments of the population to effects on the very young, the aged, the infirm, 
and other susceptible individuals.”  S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 7. More specifically, the Report 
stressed that NAAQS were to protect the health of sensitive subpopulations such as bronchial 
asthmatics and emphysematics.  Id. at 10. 
 119. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-95,  §109(d)(1), §106(a), 91 Stat. at 
691. 
 120. §109(d)(2), § 106(a), 91 Stat. at 691. 
 121. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 108, § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1678 
(emphasis added). 
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anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”122  This amendment 
followed directly from EPA’s experience in regulating airborne lead.123 
The current shape and content of the air quality criteria and standards are 
thus the products of not just one, but many, congressional decisions made over 
a period of decades.  These congressional decisions, moreover, came in 
response to the executive’s own experience in implementing federal air 
pollution policy.  In ways large and small, Congress has continually adjusted 
EPA’s course in implementing the Clean Air Act. Congress even passed 
legislation in response to the very standards at issue in American Trucking.124  
The tradition of dialogue and collaboration between Congress and the 
executive reflected in these decades of congressional and executive actions 
shows that the purpose of the nondelegation doctrine—to prevent Congress 
from forsaking its legislative role—is amply satisfied by the active 
congressional engagement that has given the Clean Air Act the form it has 
today. 
III.  QUANTITATIVE METASTANDARDS AND THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 
The Clean Air Act easily satisfies the Supreme Court’s existing 
requirements for assignments of authority from Congress to the executive.  The 
D.C. Circuit, however, apparently thought that a reworking of these 
requirements was appropriate.  Specifically, the court seems to have 
required—from Congress or EPA, it did not care which—numerical, or 
quantitative, guidance for the agency.  This new requirement is evident in the 
court’s hints as to the kinds of guidance that would, in its view, be 
constitutionally satisfactory: cost-benefit analysis, “generic unit[s] of harm,” 
and quality-adjusted life-years.  All of these approaches would make 
regulatory action turn on pre-existing, quantitative guidelines.  Because the 
 
 122. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 108(a)(1)(A), §401(a), 91 
Stat. at 791 (emphasis added). 
 123. The House Report accompanying the 1977 amendments explained that the inclusion of 
the “may reasonably be anticipated” language was a direct response to Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 
F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) (upholding EPA’s regulation of lead in 
gasoline), and was meant “to emphasize the preventive or precautionary nature of the act, i.e., to 
assure that regulatory action can effectively prevent harm before it occurs” and “to reflect 
awareness of the uncertainties and limitations in the data which will be available to the 
Administrator in the foreseeable future to enable him to execute his duties under this act.”  H.R. 
REP. NO. 95-294, at 43-53 (1st Sess. 1977). 
 124. See Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, §§ 6101-04, 
112 Stat. 463-65 (1998).  This legislation adjusted the deadlines for designating areas pursuant to 
the revised NAAQS, although it did not alter the standards themselves.  §§ 6102(c)(1), 6102(d), 
112 Stat. at 464-65 (adjusting deadlines for designations under new PM NAAQS); § 6103, 112 
Stat. at 465 (adjusting deadlines for designations under ozone NAAQS); § 6104, 112 Stat. at 465 
(stating that statute should not be construed to affect pending litigation or to ratify revised 
standards). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
142 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:121 
court of appeals found no numerical “cut-off point” for national air quality 
standards in either the Clean Air Act itself or EPA’s interpretation of it, it held 
that neither the statute nor EPA’s interpretation provided the “intelligible 
principle” that the Court has required of assignments of authority from 
Congress to the executive.125 In so holding, the court revealed a deep 
misunderstanding of the nondelegation doctrine. 
The Supreme Court has never required the kind of quantitative guidance 
from Congress (or from the agency itself) that the court of appeals seems to 
have required.  Indeed, in the flood of delegation litigation inspired by the 
Court’s rulings in Schechter and Panama Refining, the Court addressed and 
rejected precisely this kind of claim.  In a series of cases brought before the 
Court in the 1940s, regulated entities objected to giving any policymaking 
discretion to agencies at all, and the federal government responded in its briefs 
to the Court by denying, for example, that Congress was required to establish a 
“mathematical formula” for agency action.126  The Court squarely rejected the 
claim that Congress must speak with mathematical precision: 
It is not necessary that Congress supply administrative officials with a specific 
formula for their guidance in a field where flexibility and the adaptation of the 
congressional policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence of 
the program.127 
The Court recognized that requiring such specificity from Congress would 
require forgoing the advantages of turning to an administrative agency in the 
first place: 
[T]he effectiveness of both the legislative and administrative processes would 
become endangered if Congress were under the constitutional compulsion of 
filling in the details beyond the liberal prescription here.  Then the burdens of 
minutiae would be apt to clog the administration of the law and deprive the 
agency of that flexibility and dispatch which are its salient virtues.128 
In recent years, the Court has had an opportunity to revisit its precedents 
upholding Congress’s power to assign responsibility to the executive under 
broad qualitative guidelines.  In Skinner,129 the Court faced a challenge to the 
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA).130  
COBRA directed the Secretary of Transportation to set pipeline safety user 
 
 125. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 
(1935). 
 126. Brief for United States at 62, Lichter, 334 U.S. 742 (No. 99-1257). 
 127. Lichter, 334 U.S. at 785. 
 128. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940). 
 129. Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989). 
 130. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconcilitation Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-272, 100 
Stat. 82 (1986). 
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fees that bore a “reasonable relationship” to volume-miles, miles, or 
revenues.131  In a unanimous opinion, the Court said that it had “no doubt” that 
COBRA’s restrictions on the Secretary’s discretion satisfied the requirements 
of the delegation doctrine,132 despite the fact that COBRA, like the Clean Air 
Act, uses qualitative guidelines to govern the establishment of quantitative 
fees.133 
The Court also had an opportunity to revisit the nondelegation doctrine in 
Touby.134  Touby challenged Congress’s assignment of authority to the 
Attorney General to schedule controlled substances—and thus to criminalize 
their possession and distribution—on a temporary basis.  A unanimous Court 
again had no trouble finding that the Controlled Substances Act’s standard of 
“imminent hazard to public safety”—which required consideration of a drug’s 
“history and current pattern of abuse,” the “scope, duration, and significance of 
abuse,” and “what, if any, risk there is to the public health”—was the kind of 
“intelligible principle” required by its delegation decisions.135  The standard 
requiring an “imminent hazard to public safety” poses challenges for the 
Attorney General that are strikingly similar to those faced by EPA in setting 
the NAAQS.  Nowhere in Touby did the Court suggest that the Controlled 
Substances Act was problematic because it did not supply quantitative limits 
for the Attorney General’s discretion. 
Thus the Supreme Court has never required that congressional assignments 
of authority to the executive take a particular form, be it numerical or 
otherwise.  Instead, the Court has long held that “so long as Congress provides 
an administrative agency with standards guiding its actions such that a court 
could ‘ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed,’ no delegation 
of legislative authority trenching on the principle of separation of powers has 
occurred.”136  Applying this well-settled rule, the Court has upheld numerous 
broad assignments of authority to the executive.137  And, as noted, the Court 
 
 131. Skinner, 490 U.S. at 219. 
 132. Id. at 220. 
 133. Indeed, the only significant issue in that case was whether assignments of authority to 
the executive made pursuant to Congress’s taxing power should be scrutinized more strictly than 
other assignments have been; the answer to this question was no.  See id. at 222-23. 
 134. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991). 
 135. Id. at 166-67. 
 136. Skinner, 490 U.S. at 218 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989)); 
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944). 
 137. See, e.g., Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (affirming 
Federal Communication Commission’s authority to regulate broadcast licensing in the “public 
interest”); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968) (upholding FCC’s 
authority to issue regulations “as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires”); FPC v. 
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600 (1944) (upholding Federal Power Commission’s 
authority to determine “just and reasonable rates”). 
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has in recent years strongly reaffirmed Congress’s authority to use broad 
guidelines in assigning authority to the executive.138 
The notion, embraced by the D.C. Circuit, that a congressional assignment 
of authority, or an agency’s exercise of that authority, is constitutionally 
defective because it does not specify precise stopping points for regulation 
would require fundamental restructuring of much of modern government.  A 
good deal of legislation takes precisely the same form that the court of appeals 
found unconstitutional: a qualitative directive to the agency—to set utility rates 
that are “just and “reasonable,”139 to set pipeline fees based on a “reasonable 
relationship” to revenue and other factors,140 or to regulate the height and 
width of bridges to prevent navigational obstructions,141 to name only a few 
examples—must be translated by an agency into a numerical rule.  The Court 
has never invalidated this kind of legislation.  In the context of air pollution 
control, as in many other regulatory settings, requiring a quantitative meta-
standard from Congress (or from an agency) would effectively preclude much 
governmental action. 
Given the dynamic nature of scientific inquiry and the multifarious issues 
that arise when regulating air pollutants that have very different effects, and 
mechanisms of effects, on human health and welfare, it would be quite 
impossible to devise in advance a catch-all, quantitative standard to govern all 
decisions setting NAAQS.  The human health effects alone of air pollution—
quite apart from the multitudinous effects on human welfare—vary widely, 
including such different effects as the initiation and aggravation of respiratory 
diseases including bronchitis142 and asthma,143 impairment of the oxygen-
carrying capacity of the blood,144 reduced cognitive capacity,145 and premature 
death.146  Moreover, because air pollutants’ harmful mechanisms vary, the 
technical issues that arise in identifying pollutants’ consequences vary as 
well.147  The court of appeals’ fixation on the possibility that EPA could 
 
 138. See Skinner, 490 U.S. at 212; Touby, 500 U.S. at 160; Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 
748 (1996). 
 139. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 600. 
 140. Skinner, 490 U.S. at 219. 
 141. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907) (upholding against 
nondelegation challenge federal statute assigning authority to Secretary of War to regulate height 
and width of bridges over navigable waterways). 
 142. See 1971 NOx Criteria Doc., supra note 99, at 11-8. 
 143. See 1970 Ozone Criteria Doc., supra note 85, at 10-7. 
 144. See 1970 CO Criteria Doc., supra note 85, at 10-3. 
 145. See EPA, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR LEAD 13-6 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Lead Criteria 
Doc.]. 
 146. See 1967 SOx Criteria Doc., supra note 73, at xxix. 
 147. See, e.g., 1977 Lead Criteria Doc., supra note 145, at 13-1 to 13-4 (discussing 
complexities of isolating effects of airborne lead exposure from other lead sources and identifying 
relationship between exposure levels and blood concentrations of lead); 1970 CO Criteria Doc., 
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develop a “generic unit of harm” under the Clean Air Act revealed a complete 
lack of recognition of the multifarious nature of the harms created by air 
pollution.  The court’s focus on “quality-adjusted life-years” (or “QALYs”) 
betrayed an even deeper misunderstanding: many of the harms prevented by air 
pollution regulation do not involve the premature mortality that is at the core of 
the “QALY” analysis the court embraced. 
To require Congress (or, as the D.C. Circuit did, the agency) to foresee and 
address all of the subsidiary issues that arise in regulating air pollutants would 
be to prevent Congress from assigning authority to the executive at all in this 
context.  The Supreme Court has never required such a degree of specificity 
from Congress as would effectively preclude congressional action on a 
particular problem.  On the contrary, the Court has recognized that “[t]o 
burden Congress with all federal rulemaking would divert that branch from 
more pressing issues, and defeat the Framers’ design of a workable National 
Government.”148  Indeed, it is fair to say that “a certain degree of discretion, 
and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action . . . .”149  
The Court has always held, therefore, that Congress may “seek[] assistance, 
within proper limits, from its coordinate Branches . . . . Thus, Congress does 
not violate the Constitution merely because it legislates in broad terms, leaving 
a certain degree of discretion to executive or judicial actors.”150  The court of 
appeals’ reworking of the nondelegation doctrine was, in essence, an effective 
but misguided means of achieving deregulation through the courts rather than 
Congress. 
IV.  THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Once the D.C. Circuit had held both that EPA’s current approach to setting 
the NAAQS violated the nondelegation doctrine and that EPA could not solve 
this problem by using cost-benefit analysis to set the NAAQS because prior 
circuit precedent forbade this approach,151 industry groups saw an opening to 
argue for a reinterpretation of the Act to incorporate the consideration of 
economic costs in setting the NAAQS.  Thus, when parties supporting EPA’s 
PM and ozone rules petitioned for certiorari on the issue of delegation, industry 
groups conditionally cross-petitioned on the issue of the relevance of costs in 
setting the NAAQS, arguing that a ruling that required152 EPA to consider 
 
supra note 85, at 10-3 to 10-4 (addressing relationship between carbon monoxide exposure levels 
and resulting levels of carboxyhemoglobin in blood). 
 148. Loving, 517 U.S. at 758. 
 149. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 150. Touby, 500 U.S. at 165. 
 151. Lead Industries Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
1042 (1980). 
 152. Cross-petitioners American Trucking Ass’ns et al., suggested in their cross-petition that 
EPA was merely permitted to consider costs in setting the NAAQS.  Brief of Am. Trucking 
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costs in setting the NAAQS would allow the Court to avoid the constitutional 
question of delegation.153 
At this point, however, most of the groups opposing EPA’s new rules must 
have found themselves in a box.  On the one hand, to be sure, the D.C. Circuit 
(in particular, Judge Williams) had suggested that cost-benefit balancing would 
solve the new nondelegation problem it had identified.  A careful reading of 
the opinion preceding American Trucking, the Lockout/Tagout I case, shows 
that Judge Williams believed this because the kind of balancing he had in mind 
was formal cost-benefit analysis.154  Industry groups, on the other hand, 
seemed most disinclined to argue to the Supreme Court that the Clean Air 
Act—which does not so much as mention economic costs in the crucial 
statutory passages—not only required some kind of cost-benefit balancing in 
setting the NAAQS, but required cost-benefit balancing of the most 
controversial kind: formal cost-benefit analysis, in which human lives and 
human illness are quantified and monetized.  As I will explain, industry 
parties’ understandable unwillingness to argue that formal cost-benefit analysis 
is required by the Clean Air Act meant that they were left embracing a vague, 
unspecified kind of balancing that did nothing to ameliorate the constitutional 
defect as they perceived it. 
As set forth above, the D.C. Circuit created a new requirement in the name 
of the nondelegation doctrine—one that demands that guidance for 
administrative action prescribe a quantitative “stopping point” for regulation.  
The problem for the industry parties supporting the court of appeals’ decision 
was that the various interpretations of the Clean Air Act they offered to the 
Supreme Court did not supply such a “stopping point.”155  Nowhere in their 
many briefs to the Court did these parties and their amici identify exactly what 
the cost-benefit balancing they desired would entail.  Indeed, they offered the 
 
Ass’ns at 22, Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Browner, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (No. 99-1426).  In their 
briefs on the merits, however, they took the position that EPA was required to consider costs in 
this context.  Id. at 32. 
 153. See Conditional Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Am. Trucking (No. 99-1426). 
 154. In Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. 
OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Lockout/Tagout I], the court suggested that 
OSHA could avoid the invalidation of the safety-related provisions of the OSHAct on 
nondelegation grounds by interpreting those provisions to allow cost-benefit analysis.  Id. at 
1316-21.  Writing for the court, Judge Williams explained what he meant by cost-benefit analysis: 
“Cost-benefit analysis requires identifying values for lost years of human life and for suffering 
and other losses from non-fatal injuries.”  Id. at 1320. 
 155. Cross-petitioners and their supporters could not even agree as to whether the Act permits 
or requires EPA to consider costs in setting the NAAQS.  Compare Brief of Cross-petitioners 
Am. Trucking Ass’ns at 32, Am. Trucking (No. 99-1426) with Brief of Amici Curiae Senator 
James M. Inhofe in Support of Cross-Petitioners at 10, Am. Trucking (No. 99-1426).  Cf. Indus. 
Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Instit., 448 U.S. 607, 672 (1980) [hereinafter Benzene] 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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Court a virtual smorgasbord of possibilities, ranging from analysis “under 
‘significant risk’ and similar rubrics” to analysis based on “quality-adjusted 
life years” to the kind of cost-benefit analysis endorsed in Lockout/Tagout I,156 
which required “identifying values for lost years of human life and for 
suffering and other losses from non-fatal injuries.”157 
Quite apart from the administrative license created by this failure to choose 
among the multitudinous ways in which costs could be taken into account in 
setting regulatory standards, none of the profferred analytical frameworks, 
even viewed in isolation, identified the kind of stopping point for regulation 
that the D.C. Circuit required.  An instruction from the Supreme Court telling 
EPA to consider quality-adjusted life years rather than lives lost, for example, 
would not have told EPA how many life years it should strive to save.  It 
would, at most, have told the agency not to worry quite so much about the 
effects of air pollution on the elderly, the disabled, and the ill. 
Industry parties’ argument that a simple directive to EPA to “consider[] 
costs and other countervailing factors,”158 would somehow have provided 
determinate results was built upon the mistaken premise that cost-benefit 
balancing is a monolithic methodology.  Balancing tests in health and safety 
regulation cover a vast territory.  They include quite traditional “command-
and-control” regulation, mandating the use of particular technologies;159 
regulation comparing the risks of not regulating with the risks of regulating;160 
open-ended balancing of a wide range of factors;161 and regulation based on 
formal cost-benefit analysis and consumer willingness to pay for reductions in 
health risks.162 
Thus, where Congress has called for balancing in standard-setting, it has 
chosen from a wide array of options and has tailored the balancing to fit the 
specific circumstances at hand.  Congress’s failure to identify a specific kind of 
cost-benefit balancing in the NAAQS provisions of the Clean Air Act bolsters 
the conclusion that Congress simply did not permit such balancing to occur in 
setting the NAAQS.  Moreover, industry parties’ own inability to identify the 
nature of the balancing they had in mind unraveled their argument that their 
reinterpretation of the Act would limit EPA’s discretion.  Faced with their 
suggested directive—to “consider all logically relevant factors” in setting the 
 
 156. Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 157. Id. at 1320. 
 158. See, e.g., Brief of Cross-petitioners Am. Trucking Ass’ns at 50, Am. Trucking (No. 99-
1426). 
 159. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (2000). 
 160. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2) (2000); Food Quality 
Protection Act of 1996, 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(B)(iii)(I)-(II)(2000). 
 161. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1) (2000). 
 162. See Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(6)(A), 
(b)(3)(C)(iii) (1996). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
148 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:121 
NAAQS163—EPA would have been free to do anything from setting 
technology-based, command-and-control-style regulations, to balancing risk 
against risk, to ceasing regulation at the point where the people hurt by air 
pollution were unwilling to pay the amount it would cost to prevent the 
pollution that hurt them.  Clearly, it was not a limit on agency discretion that 
these parties were after; it was merely a limit on regulation that they desired. 
Some industry groups even went so far as to argue that the Clean Air Act 
could not be constitutional so long as it precluded EPA from balancing “all 
logically relevant factors,” including costs, in setting the NAAQS.164  Their 
constitutional argument thus amounted to this: section 109 of the Clean Air 
Act, as interpreted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for thirty 
years, effected an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because it 
did not confer sufficient discretion on the agency.  This was, to say the least, 
an unusual reworking of a constitutional doctrine designed to cabin rather than 
enlarge agency discretion.  It would be most odd to mandate open-ended 
balancing by agencies in the name of the nondelegation doctrine. 
Ironically, under these parties’ reworking of the nondelegation doctrine, 
Congress would find itself in more trouble, the more it attempted to constrain 
discretion by limiting the factors an agency may consider.  On their theory, for 
example, section 7 of the Endangered Species Act,165 must effect an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because it requires federal 
agencies to shape their actions according to their effect on the continued 
existence of protected species, without regard to cost.166  Similarly, if their 
approach were correct, then the Supreme Court created a constitutional 
problem when it interpreted the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHAct) 
to require the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to find 
a “significant risk” (without considering cost) before regulating workplace 
toxins.167 
In sum, not only would a good deal of federal legislation be open to the 
courts’ disapproval under the perspective that was offered by industry groups 
 
 163. Brief of Respondents Am. Trucking Ass’ns at 11, Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 120 
S. Ct. 2003 (No. 99-1257). 
 164. Brief of Respondents Am. Trucking Ass’ns at 11, Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns (No. 
99-1257). See also Brief for Respondents Appalachian Power Co. at 34, Browner v. Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns (No. 99-1257). 
 165. 16 U.S.C. § 1536. 
 166. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-88 (1978). 
 167. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 639-40; see also Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 
490, 505 n.25 (1981) (approving OSHA’s health-based method for finding significant health 
hazard).  Like the Clean Air Act, the OSHAct requires the consideration of costs in determining 
exactly what requirements will be imposed on individual sources of risk.  Id. at 508-09 
(feasibility analysis required in setting workplace standards); Mass. & N.J. Brief at 24-28, Am. 
Trucking (No. 99-1426) (discussing manifold ways in which costs and feasibility relevant to 
decisions implementing the NAAQS). 
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opposing EPA’s PM and ozone rules, but it would be open to such disapproval 
on the ground that it confined agency discretion through limitations on the 
factors agencies could consider. 
Even formal cost-benefit analysis, however, would not have solved the 
constitutional problem as the D.C. Circuit and the industry groups opposing 
EPA’s new rules saw it.  As Judge Williams explained for the court in 
Lockout/Tagout I, “Cost-benefit analysis requires identifying values for lost 
years of human life and for suffering and other losses from non-fatal 
injuries.”168  What the D.C. Circuit failed to appreciate is that the potential 
“range of values” for human life and human suffering is vast, perhaps even 
infinite, even when these values are determined by considering individuals’ 
willingness to bargain for risk-related benefits.169  Sometimes, for example, 
people simply refuse to participate in markets for risks to human life; in one 
study, researchers found that the majority of parents asked how steep a price 
discount they would require to accept riskier household products responded 
that they would not buy the products at all.170  Other researchers have found, in 
contrast, that some workers receive no extra wage for riskier work; such results 
imply that, in some cases, enhanced risk has zero value in the marketplace.171  
“Willingness to pay” values for human life thus might plausibly range from 
zero to priceless.  The bare requirement of cost-benefit analysis thus arguably 
enlarges rather than constricts the range of permissible agency responses to 
matters of life and death. 
Cost-benefit analysis is, moreover, in considerable tension with the public-
health-regarding goals of the Clean Air Act.  Because of the proclivity of cost-
benefit analysis for quantification and commensuration, cost-benefit analysis 
tends to highlight those costs and benefits that can be both quantified and 
stated in terms of a common metric, such as dollars.  It follows that cost-
benefit analysis tends to underrate those things that cannot be so quantified and 
monetized; it tends, in Professor Tribe’s famous formulation, to “dwarf[] soft 
variables.”172 
This feature of cost-benefit analysis makes it a particularly unhelpful 
analytical framework for setting air quality standards under the Clean Air Act.  
 
 168. Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d at 1320. 
 169. In a concurrence to his own panel opinion, Judge Williams further elaborated on the 
process of setting a “numerical value on human life,” noting that “[p]reference-based techniques 
are a commonly used approach, but are subject to such pitfalls as wealth bias, age bias and 
inconsistency.”  Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d at 1326 & n.1 (citation omitted). 
 170. See W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat, & Joel Huber, An Investigation of the Rationality 
of Consumer Valuations of Multiple Health Risks, 18 RAND J. ECON. 476, 477 (1987). 
 171. See Julie Graham, Don M. Shakow, & Christopher Cyr, Risk Compensation—In Theory 
and Practice, 25 ENVT. 14, 19-20 (1983). 
 172. Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for 
Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1318-19 & n.25 (1974). 
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While a retrospective cost-benefit analysis may, like that done with respect to 
the Clean Air Act, demonstrate the wisdom of policy choices decades after 
those choices were made, a prospective cost-benefit analysis might have 
discouraged a policymaker from making those very same choices in the first 
instance.  As explained below, prospective cost-benefit analysis would tend to 
have the following effect: it would tend to overestimate costs (because it could 
not adequately account for technological innovation) and underestimate 
benefits (because so many important things cannot be counted).  The result 
would likely be a systematic tendency toward underprotection of the health and 
welfare central to the Act. 
On the cost side, for example, it is very difficult accurately to estimate the 
consequences of a technology-forcing regulatory requirement before that 
requirement has forced any technology.  It is much easier to assume that the 
technology used to implement the new requirement will be the same as, and 
cost as much as, the technology that existed before the requirement was 
imposed.  And indeed, this is the approach taken by EPA when it has, as it is 
obliged to do by Executive Order, tried to estimate the costs of the NAAQS.  
With respect to the rules at issue here, EPA thought its cost estimates would 
prove to be significantly overstated because of the likely effects of 
technological innovations.173  But the agency could not quantify these effects, 
and so they do not show up in its economic analysis. 
Likewise, with respect to benefits, the empirical and normative complexity 
of quantifying and monetizing the benefits of good health, long life, and fresh 
air are well known.  When these benefits cannot be quantified or monetized, 
they do not amount to much in cost-benefit analysis.174  Even when they can be 
both quantified and monetized, an important normative shift occurs when the 
analyst begins to ask not how clean must the air be to protect public health but 
how much would citizens pay to make it so.175 
In short, then, even formal cost-benefit analysis would not have succeeded 
in satisfying the D.C. Circuit’s new requirement of a precise stopping point for 
regulation.  It almost certainly would have succeeded, however, in 
undermining health and environmental protection under the Clean Air Act. 
 
 173. See Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Environmental Protection Agency, 
Regulatory Impact Analyses for the Particulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS and Proposed 
Regional Haze Rule at 9-2 to 9-4 (1997). 
 174. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1219 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(dismissing importance of unquantified benefits of banning asbestos in course of disapproving 
EPA’s cost-benefit analysis of the ban). 
 175. Cf. Tribe, supra note 172, at 1329-32. 
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CONCLUSION 
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in American Trucking was a law professor’s 
dream: brimming with complex legal issues and high-stakes public policy 
disputes, and culminating in the revival and reworking of a moribund 
constitutional doctrine, the case could have kept students of administrative law, 
environmental law, and regulatory policy gainfully employed for many years.  
I have only touched here on only one of the many issues presented in the case, 
and that is the question whether the Clean Air Act violates the nondelegation 
doctrine.  I think it is clear that it does not, and the Supreme Court has 
unanimously agreed. 
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